

# Evaluating Artificial Consciousness through Integrated Information Theory

#### Acknowledgements

Giulio Tononi



Larissa Albantakis



Graham Findlay




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
#### Why study artificial consciousness?





#### Intelligence and Consciousness?




#### Intelligence and Consciousnes ( )









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





Is this thing conscious? In what way?




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### Dissociating Artificial Intelligence from Artificial Consciousness

Graham Findlay<sup>a,b,1</sup>, William Marshall<sup>c,1</sup>, Isaac David<sup>a,b</sup>, Larissa Albantakis<sup>a</sup>, William GP Mayner<sup>a,b</sup>, Christof Koch<sup>d</sup>, and Giulio Tononi<sup>a,2</sup>

This manuscript was compiled on September 30, 2024

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Developments in machine learning and computing power suggest that artificial general intelligence may be within reach. This raises the question of artificial consciousness: if a computer were functionally equivalent to a human, having the same cognitive abilities. would it experience sights, sounds, and thoughts, as we do when we are conscious? Answering this question in a principled manner can only be done on the basis of a theory of consciousness that is grounded in phenomenology and its essential properties, translates them into measurable quantities, can be validated on humans, and can be extrapolated to any physical system. Here we employ Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which provides principled tools to determine whether a system is conscious, to what degree, and the content of its experience. We consider pairs of systems constituted of simple Boolean units, one of which - a basic stored-program computer - simulates the other with full functional equivalence. By applying the principles of IIT, we demonstrate that (i) two systems can be functionally equivalent without being phenomenally equivalent; (ii) that this conclusion applies no matter how one 'macros' the computer's units; and (iii) that even certain Turing-complete systems, which could theoretically pass the Turing test and simulate a human brain in detail, would be negligibly conscious.

#### Significance Statement


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
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
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Recent years have seen dramatic advancements in artificial intelligence (AI). Thanks to high-profile applications of this technology (e.g. AlphaGo, AlphaFold, ChatGPT), expectations about Al are at an alltime high. How we interact with Al will depend on whether we have reasons to believe that they are conscious entities with the ability to experience, for example, pain and pleasure. We address this question within the framework of integrated information theory (IIT), a general theory of consciousness that allows extrapolations to non-









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
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
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
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
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




#### What comes next?

- More validation in IIT healthy adult humans
  - Develop computational and statistical tools to support empirical research

- Exploring alternative substrates for machine consciousness
  - Neuromorphic computers or quantum computers





#### Thanks for listening!



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